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1. Rationality
An agent is situated in the world. The world is composed of physical objects and changes through
time; Events occur and are related to one another. The agent is a being of the world -- it is a physical
object and hence can participate in the world. The agent can affect the world according to its
abilities, and can be affected by the world. The agent's relationship with the world is Intentional:
some things matter to the agent, some things in the world mean things to the agent, the agent has
goals and desires and intentions and beliefs, all of which are about things or states of affairs in the
world.
The agent can perform actions. As a physical object in the world, changes in the agent can cause
changes in the world. As an Intentional being, the agent can perform actions in the world in order to
realize certain effects. Since actions are supposed to have certain results, we can speak of success
or failure of actions. We can speak of the agent taking an action to prepare for other actions, or to
achieve a certain goal or to satisfy a desire. Actions, in general, depend on the situation both in order
to enable their being taken, and for the effects they will have.
Given an agent with certain abilities and certain goals, intentions, or desires, in a specific situation,
we can judge if a certain action is reasonable or sensible, or that one action would be better or worse
than another. An agent in the course of acting considers its situation and its abilities, chooses an
action to take, and then attempts it. This "practical reasoning" also involves a judgment as to the
best or right action for an agent (in this case the one making the judgment) in a situation. I suggest
that the term rational is applied to actions which are judged to be correct, right, or good ones to
perform in a situation. Judgments about the rationality of an action are defeasible in that more
information about the situation, agent, or proposed action, can change judgments about the
rationality of the action.
Rationality is the notion of the "right action" to do in a situation. A theory of rationality would be a
theory which could be applied to a situation and an agent in order to ascertain the quality of certain
potential actions in that situation. As we are rational agents, the theory would be prescriptive in that it
would indicate the right thing for any rational agent to do in that situation: the results of the theory
take the form "a rational agent (and therefore you) ought to do this action in this situation." But the
theory will also involve a description of the workings of a rational agent. In particular, the rational
agent is one which performs (or tends to perform) the rational act in a situation. because it is the
Rationality
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rational act according to the prescriptive theory. A theory of rationality must explain how the rational
agent is bound by, and obeys, the prescriptions of the theory.
Rationality is not perfection. While there may be a better thing to do in some situation, there may not
be a better thing for the agent to do, given the abilities of the agent and particulars about its situation.
Rationality involves dealing with the finiteness of the agent, with its faults, inadequacies and
limitations. An important way in which agents are finite is in their ability to judge the rationality of
actions. Humans are rational agents to the extent that they attempt to "do their best" in their day to
day activities. But I will not develop any notion of "perfect" rationality to which humans are mere
approximations. The notion of rationality only makes sense for finite, limited agents.
Dealing as it does with questions of "ought" and "should" and "right", a theory of rationality has a
close relation with ethics. Indeed most ethical theories have presupposed a rational agent who
attempts to be (or just is) also a moral agent. I will be examining the question of the rightness of
actions in terms of the actions themselves, not with respect to any conception of morality. I will be
dealing with a solitary agent -- one which is alone in a world with no other rational agents -- so the
ethical questions of relating to other rational agents will not be addressed.
Rationality
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2. Motivation for this Research
Artificial intelligence needs a theory of rational action. To the extent that artificial intelligence is about
intelligence, the field really is the study of rationality. But very little research in Al broaches the
subject directly. Much of Al research has concentrated on limited domains, or on specific abilities. In
the first case, the expertise of a program in a particular domain need bear no relationship to the
question of rationality in general. In the second case, the importance of a specific ability (eg: finding
analogies), or a choice of details in a theory thereof, is very difficult to judge in the absence of a more
general framework into which the ability is ultimately supposed to fit.
Not only must Al devote attention to general theories of rationality, but it must also shed the dualistic
tradition which holds that the seat of rationality is a disembodied mind. The attraction of this view
(apart from its having been the more-or-less standard view of Anglo-American philosophy) is that it
suggests a natural role for computation. In modern Cognitive Science, mental states and processes
are specified in computational terms. These states and processes are then assumed to be
implemented in the brain, which is viewed as a kind of computer. But it is only the abstract processes
and states which constitute the "mental" aspects of the theories, interaction with the world is limited
to formally specifiable input and output modules. This makes the most fundamental aspect of the
"mental states" -- their being about things "outside" the mind -- the source of the most unwieldy
problems such theories must ultimately resolve.
Instead I suggest that we theorize about embodied agents situated in the world. There is only the
world, and the agent is a part of it. Instead of "mental" entities, we should speak of the
characteristically "Intentional" aspects of those physical entities which are agents. The Intentional
states of the agent (for example, its having a certain desire) are realized in physical states of the
agent's body. The difference between actions that affect the world outside the agent's body and
those that affect states of the agent is merely a difference in the location and specifics of physical
effects, not a difference between "mental" and physical actions. Thinking is a kind of doing.
There is a natural place for computation in theories of this kind also. Computers are physical objects
in the world. A computer program is a representation of the behavior of a physical object. A token of
a program, placed in a specific relation to a computer can cause the very behavior it represents.
Computation is therefore a link between the Intentional world of representations and the physical
world of states and events. A computational theory of rationality would involve an account of the
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relationship between representations of actions and their being taken. And the "realized in"
relationship between the Intentional states of a rational agent and the physical states of its body could
be the reasonably well understood "implemented in" relationship between a computational system
and its hardware and software components.
Artificial intelligence work has always presupposed some idea of rationality. The use of a heuristic in
a program involves the feeling that the heuristic action is reasonable or justified or sensible in a
particular situation. A specific representational system is presented with certain assumptions about
the sort of useful inference actions which must be made with it. And all Al researchers have had to
make decisions about control. This information, most often fixed by the programmer, embodies a
more or less explicit commitment that some sequence of steps is "better" or "more reasonable" than
its alternatives.
Al systems often solve problems involving complex decisions by means of a search through a
formalized space. In most interesting domains, searches are difficult and expensive, and often are
not even guaranteed to produce the desired result. So the best thing to do in such domains is not to
search at all. Instead it would be superior to think about what is being done in a way that makes the
search unnecessary, or to reformalize the search space to make the problem easier. This means that
programs must have much greater access to their control structures, both to allow the programmer to
specify more clever control strategies, and to allow a program to manipulate its control structure to
best advantage. Programs must become programmers; their domains of expertise must include
themselves. Programs must be made to understand the implicit theory of "best action" -- of
rationality -- which programmers use when designing them. This means that a theory of rationality
must be made explicit and the explicit theory must be made accessible to programs.
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3. Outline of the Theory
The theory of rational action which I am developing is based on viewing thinking as a kind of action
and thus itself subject to the prescriptions of the theory. The theory is intellectualist in that it depicts
rationality as a matter of explicit reasoning. A rational agent is viewed as being introspective in that
all of its internal states (for example its intentions and desires) are subject to inspection and
manipulation by the agent. It is by this manipulation that the agent controls its actions. The theory is
computational in that the rational agent is viewed as physically embodied in an object which may be
controlled by a representation of the desired behavior: a program.
The theory has two main parts: the "structural theory" which describes what an agent can do, and the
"deontic theory" which describes what an agent should do. The theory is recursive, in that the
generation of a rational act requires the agent to perform other rational actions as precursors (for
example: deliberating about what to do). In the following paragraphs I will present a terse summary of
the theory as it stands. The full development and completion of the theory remains a goal of this
research.
3.1 The Structural Theory
The structural theory is the part of the theory of rationality which deals with the states and events and
processes involved in the generation of rational acts. In the structural theory we describe the agent
as being in a situation and as performing the rational act for that situation. One of the things an agent
can do in any situation is to choose to deliberate about the situation and apply the theory of rationality
in order to determine what to do. So the structural theory must include these deliberation actions as a
part of the structure of situations and actions surrounding an action.
To express and represent the structural theory, we must first have a model of how events occur in the
world. A "model of occurrences" is an account of how events occur and are related. The model
involves "intervals" which are partial descriptions of the world. An interval is "satisfied" if the world
is as described for a certain period of time. Intervals are related in time, and events in intervals can
causally affect events in other intervals. The world contains physical objects and the behavior of
those objects can be described by describing the possible sequences of intervals satisfied by the
object over time.
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The world also contains the rational agent. An ability involves a "possible event" which the agent
may cause. The agent must be able to interpret physical objects as representing other objects or
states of affairs. The agent may have intentions which are states that represent and cause actions of
the agent. And, as I have emphasized, some of the actions of the agent are "internal" in that they
affect only the state of the agent; for example, the action of coming to have a specific intention.
Within the model of occurrences we will be able to express the notion of a plan or an action having a
goal or purpose: roughly speaking, the goal of an action is the occurrence (or class of occurrences)
which would count as the action's "succeeding." We can characterize the notion of planning as a
process of actions (representable as occurrences involving the agent) which attempts to discover a
representation of a process which will satisfy a certain set of goals and which is within the abilities of
the agent in some possible situation. The execution of a plan will involve steps taken to test the world
to make sure that the plan is succeeding.
I will represent the structural theory of rationality within this model of the world and the agent. As the
agent is presumed to deal with an explicit theory of rationality, the structural theory must include
descriptions of the theory itself, and the agent's use of it in determining what to do. And since the
agent must work with these descriptions, there must be an explicit theory of representation which the
agent can use to understand what it is doing as it manipulates these descriptions.
3.2 The Deontic Theory
The deontic theory of rationality is used to decide what the agent ought to do. It is the aspect of the
theory which actually tells the agent what to do, or how to figure out what to do. These conclusions,
called "rational imperatives", are expressed in the structural theory, as are the situation and the
potential actions of the agent. A rational imperative specifies a rational action for a specific situation.
Some rational imperatives are general policies explicitly formulated and represented, perhaps while
the agent is idly thinking. Other imperatives are specific to the situation at hand and are expressed in
the action of the agent.
There are very few situations for which we can specify the correct action for all agents, for all time.
And judgments of rationality are such that in many cases, new information about, or even a new
description of a situation may change the adjudged rationality of an action in that situation. Taking
this into account, what is the deontic theory to prescribe?
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As one answer consider the following line of reasoning, which is expressible in the structural theory:
If the agent has a representation of its past actions and the situations in which they were performed,
and the agent confronts a new situation which is like a previous situation in some way, then it might
be rational to perform an action like the action previously taken. Why is this the rational act to take?
Because the agent represents itself as a rational agent, and thus as performing the rational act in a
situation. Since it remembers that it performed a specific act in a situation past, it can therefore
conclude that that action was the rational action to take in that situation. And so it should take a
similar action now. "Precedential Reasoning" is the term I give to this notion of deciding what to do
on the basis of similarities with past situations. Most of the rational imperatives in the theory I am
proposing will be based on precedential reasoning.
Precedential reasoning involves finding analogies between the current situation and previous ones.
This will involve finding mappings in the structural theory between the situations. From any action the
agent has done, it may conclude the rational imperative to do that action in that situation. It may then
generalize that imperative by mapping the specific structure of the action to less specific structures,
applicable to more situations. The agent gains expertise in a domain by solving particular problems in
the domain. Since the agent is also reasoning about its reasoning actions, it will gain expertise in the
domain of reasoning about actions. In some cases it might be able to generalize across domains as,
for example, when a similar control decision occurs in different domains.
Another class of rational imperatives determined by the deontic theory are consequences of the
finiteness of the agent. In general this class is negative, in the sense that it allows the agent to
conclude that certain actions are not rational. From "ought implies can", the agent can conclude
that "can not implies ought not". Some such limitations involve physical abilities of the agent -- an
agent which cannot weld should not make plans which require it to do so. An important limitation is
that of time: when decisions are time-critical the agent must often commit to an action which more
lengthy deliberation would reject. Other limitations involve "internal" abilities or knowledge of the
agent. For example if an agent is aware of only one method to solve a certain class of problems, then
that method is the one it ought to use, even if other methods exist.
While the limitations of the agent provide it with some answers to deontic problems, they also provide
the agent with more problems it must deal with. For example, as the agent is not perfect, it will make
mistakes and must determine what went wrong and attempt to correct them. This fact undermines the
justification for precedential reasoning -- the previous action might not have been rational. Still the
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previous action is probably the best suggestion for what to do now, especially if it seemed to work the
previous time. But the agent must be aware of the fact that this conclusion might be mistaken, and in
general, must always be ready to deal with failures and unexpected results.
3.3 The Body is a Computer
The striking aspect of practical reasoning is that it is linked to action. When an agent concludes that
an action is rational, it takes that action (at least it often does). I call this intimate connection between
the judgment and the action elan -- the property of a rational agent to actually do what it determines to
be rational. To Aristotle, elan was the most significant feature of practical reasoning, which he
referred to as reasoning "whose conclusion is an action". Indeed in the present theory, practical
reasoning is just like "theoretical" reasoning about the right action except for elan: The methods of
reasoning are the same and the same conclusions are justified in the same way but in practical
reasoning the agent does something when the conclusion is reached.
To understand elan, we recall that the body of the agent is a physical object in the world. And the
Intentional states of the agent are realized in physical states and processes of the body. Deliberation,
like other actions of the agent, involves physical processes. So the connection between deliberations
and action is just physical causation. But more must be said: the action which is taken is taken
because it is rational. The physical events occurring in the body of the agent respect the theory of
rationality. They do so because the agent, as a rational agent, makes them do so. The rational agent
controls its body by setting it up so that its states and processes will realize the appropriate
Intentional states for rational action.
This leads to a view of the body of the agent as a computational entity. A computer is a physical
object whose behavior is under the causal control of a representation of that behavior. One controls
a computer by manipulating its program. So the rational agent controls its actions by manipulating its
program. The agent controls the physical states and processes in which its Intentionality is realized
by implementing those states and processes computationally. Recall that the theory of rationality
specifies what the agent should do in situations. As the agent is rational, this is what it does do, and it
does so by consulting an explicit theory of rational action. To consult the theory, the agent must have
a representation of the theory available. This representation of the theory of rationality stands in the
same relation to the body of the agent as a program does to a computer -- the theory describes what
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the agent will do, and also causally controls what the agent will do. So the theory of rationality is part
of the program for the rational agent.
The main way that the agent controls its actions by manipulating its program is to set up its body so
that it will perform the rational action in specific situations. To do so, it must first obtain a rational
imperative from the deontic theory. It will then examine its program and determine the state the
program will enter when the situation described by the imperative occurs. It will then modify the
program so that this state is followed by the attempt to perform the action specified by the imperative.
Later, when the agent's body enters this state, the agent need do no deliberation -- it will just perform
the action. I call this kind of manipulation of the agent's program by the agent the "wiring-in" of an
action. Wired-in actions are rational -- they are performed because they are the rational thing to do.
But the determination of their rationality for the situation is performed before the situation occurs.
Most wiring-in causes a class of actions to be taken because the situation in which the action is
wired-in may be specified to any degree of generality. By a single action of wiring-in, the agent can
set itself up to perform many rational acts "automatically" in the future.
Most of the actions a rational agent takes are wired-in. This is possible because most situations are
enough like previous situations that precedential reasoning can be used to determine the appropriate
actions. So although the agent is fully introspective in that it can access any aspect of its program, it
rarely does so. It only needs to explicitly deal with a situation if it has no wired-in response to that
situation, or if its wired-in response fails. Since many actions of the agent are wired-in there may be
cases where a number of actions should and can be performed simultaneously. This may be the case
especially for internal actions, for example, considering a large number of possible actions in parallel
with simple wired-in criteria, and selecting a small number of promising actions for more careful
non-wired-in deliberation.
Agents may very well make mistakes and wire-in actions which cause behavior which, in specific
instances, could be judged to not be rational. However this does not contradict the rationality of the
agent. The action of wiring-in was rational, given what the agent knew then, or given how much time
the agent had to worry about how perfect to make the wiring-in. In some sense, by wiring-in actions,
the agent% has limited itself to perform the wired-in action in the future. When the agent later enters
the relevant situation, it performs the "irrational" action because it must -- because it is wired-in. So
the action isn't really irrational in the situation where it was performed because the agent had no
choice but to do it. Of course, the performance of irrational-seeming actions by the agent is a hint to
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it that it has made mistakes in its wiring-in and ought to "unwire" some actions or otherwise fix its
program.
3.4 Rationality by Recursion
The two kinds of solutions to problems from the deontic theory require that the agent view itself as,
respectively, a rational agent and a finite agent. Both solutions involve deliberation by the agent
about itself and its situation. Deliberation is a kind of action, so deliberation is also something to
which the theory of rationality is applicable. There is a "right thing" to do when deliberating.
Deliberative actions must be representable in the structural theory, and solutions to deliberative
"what should I do?" problems must be available from the deontic theory.
The theory is developed by elucidating these problems in the structural theory. The rational agent
must solve these subproblems in the generation of a rational act. Some such subproblems the agent
must solve include: finding a mapping between a previous situation and the current one; determining
that one of its limitations applies to the present situation; estimating how much time is available for
deliberation; discovering that some previous action was a mistake and how to fix it. Each of these
problems may be just as hard as any of the others, including the "main" problem which is being
considered. Yet each must be solved.
For there to be solutions to these problems the agent must have access to enough previous situations
so that a precedential case will be found to apply and/or it must have enough information about its
limitations (and enough limitations) to make decisions about what it must do in specific situations. I
call this the "deontic grounding" which is required for the theory of rationality to work -- there must
be enough problems~solved so that other problems can be solved.
Furthermore, enough of these situations must have wired-in actions so that the agent will be able to
perform some non wired-in action. If no actions were wired-in at all, the agent could never act at all
because it would need to somehow decide what to do, but this decision is itself an act which would
have to be chosen and so on. (This regress, by the way, is one of the major objections to the
intellectualist approach to rationality. See, for example, [Dreyfus] and [Ryle].) There must be some
wired-in actions for enough classes of situations so that this regress is terminated. There must, that
is, be some actions which just happen so that the agent need not deliberate about them. I call this the
"elan grounding" for the theory.
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So the theory of rationality is recursive in that it is defined as involving actions which themselves
require other rational actions to take place. The "body" of the recursion is represented in the
structural theory which describes the various actions and how they are related. The base cases of the
recursion come from a large set of particular situations: the "deontic grounding" is a set of specific
precedents and limitations, the "elan grounding" is a set of wired-in actions.
One of the major goals of this research is to determine these groundings. The process of
bootstrapping the implementation of the theory will bring into focus the problems which the base
cases must solve.
Implementation
4. Implementation
4.1 The Importance of the Implementation
The ultimate reason to present an implementation is to show that the recursive theory of rationality
can be grounded. This would demonstrate that the theory defines something. To the degree that
what is thus defined is related to rationality, the implementation would support the viability of the
intellectualist approach to rationality. The implementation will contribute to this by demonstrating
that a program can realize states and effect state transitions corresponding to those involved in the
generation of a rational action according to the intellectualist account I have presented.
For example, a program illustrating the theory should be able to begin in a state corresponding to
having a particular intention. It should then enter a state corresponding to deliberating about how to
realize that intention. Perhaps it would then deliberate about how to deliberate and reach some
possibly wired-in solutions. Thus it performs the deliberations and then performs the actions.
Building an implementation also provides a natural way to bound the research herein proposed.
Understanding rationality involves working out or being able to work out the rational act for any
rational agent in any situation. This is certainly a monumental task -- each instant every rational agent
finds itself in new situations to which it must respond. But those situations and associated rational
actions involved in the implementation of a rational agent provide an initial core.
Another reason to implement the theory is to demonstrate its usefulness to more practical artificial
intelligence concerns. If the theory really captures some idea of "rationality", then it ought to be
helpful in designing programs which are supposed to exhibit intelligence. The motivation for this
work came from the supposed improvement in the abilities of systems which would come with the
programs being able to reason about their own operations. The implementation of the theory of
rationality ought to make clear how this improvement can be achieved.
I must point out however, that the implementation will be a set of particular solutions to more general
problems. Many issues will be sidestepped or treated with less rigor than they deserve. Naturally,
differences on the importance of the issues thus treated will lead to differences on the relevance of
the implementation to the theory or rationality, or of the relevance of the theory itself. I will not
present any formal criteria which the implementation must satisfy to somehow "prove" the theory.
This implementation is above all an illustration of the theory.
-14- 1 April 1985
Implementation
4.2 An Imperative Interpreter
In this section I will present a very rough outline of the program I am constructing to illustrate the
theory of rational action. As I have stressed, the implementation is an important part of the research I
am proposing. But I am, after all, just proposing it -- the program is far from finished. This section is
therefore very speculative, very incomplete and may very well be simply wrong in that the ultimate
implementation could have little resemblance to that discussed here.
The program under development is called PRAXIS, the term Aristotle used for purposive, rational
action. On one hand, PRAXIS will be an "expert" program whose domain is the theory of rational
action. It will be an expert in that domain in the same way that other artificial intelligence systems are
experts in other domains, say geology or medical diagnosis. So one way to view PRAXIS is as a
software illustration of the structural theory -- the user would be able to inspect representations of
various states a rational agent would enter in the course of determining the rational action for a
situation. The program would be able to represent the relation between an action and its associated
deliberations, the conditions for success of an action, the fact of an action being wired-in to a
situation, the explicit application of the theory of rationality and so on. Some of these states will be
illustrated below.
But in PRAXIS the reasoning about action will be linked to the actions of the program. PRAXIS is best
described as an "imperative interpreter" because its operations are controlled by a set of rational
imperatives which describe what it ought to do. All of the operations of PRAXIS -- "interpreting" the
imperatives, deciding what to do based on those imperatives, and then doing what is decided -- are all
themselves chosen according to the set of imperatives. Thus PRAXIS is "reflective" in the sense
defined by [Smith] in that the interpreter has full access to representations of all aspects of its
program and its state and can manipulate those representations to affect its own behavior.
I don't expect PRAXIS to be any better at basic domain-level planning than any existing planning
program. It will use the same backward chaining method for planning invented by Aristotle and used
by virtually all Al planners. The power of PRAXIS will spring from its flexibility. Most actions of a
rational agent are not precisely planned, and even planned actions must give way to improvised
responses to unforeseen details of the environment. A rational agent must be prepared to deal with
the unexpected. PRAXIS will be so prepared by having access to a richly structured representation of
its actions and their associated mental states. With this available the program will be able to notice,
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for example, that one of its main goals has been satisfied, even while failing on some subgoal.
Rationality is as much a matter of exploiting luck as of careful planning.
PRAXIS will exercise its skills in the domain of automobile travel. The program will "drive" a simulated
car through a network of highways. The program will attempt to get from place to place in a
reasonable time. The program will have a map of the area but the map may be faulty: it may depict
roads which do not exist, or the roads it shows may go to different places. The world is not stable:
bridges may be out, roads may be under repair, traffic conditions may make certain routes
undesirable. And time constraints (the gas may be running out) will in some cases force the program
to decide quickly rather than deliberating or exploring for better solutions. This domain was inspired
by the work of [Hayes] which also had an agent traveling in the world and representing its own
reasoning process. Part of the appeal of the domain is that it captures the situatedness of an agent in
the world. Also it is hoped that the metaphor between the movement of an agent through physical
space and the progress of a problem-solving agent towards its goal (recognized in the early-Al notion
of a "problem space") will facilitate the discovery of analogical situations in the base domain and the
higher level deliberative domain. Such situations could be used as the basis of precedential
reasoning to improve performance in both domains.
For the moment we will assume that PRAXIS is always in a single well-defined state corresponding to a
particular situation. The situation may involve some aspect of the world, or it may correspond to
deliberating about some lower-level action. Each rational imperative to which PRAXIS has access has
two parts, a relevant situation in which the imperative applies, and the corresponding rational action
to take in that situation.
The following sections describe various aspects of the states PRAXIS can realize-and how they are
related. This will illustrate various aspects of rational action which the structural theory must be able
to represent. I will also present some of the deontic and elan groundings necessary for the system to
be given initially so that it will begin running.
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4.2.1 The Rational Nexus
Figure 1 illustrates the "rational nexus": a situation S and its corresponding rational action, A. The
situation and action are not further described. Thus the structure of situations and actions
surrounding the rational nexus surrounds all actions.
We represent the state of the agent when it is in situation S as S'. The PRAXIS system will manipulate
data structures corresponding to the various states the agent will enter. The data structures could
simply consist of a partial list of statements true in the situation. More efficient representations of the
state would involving representing states as related to other states in various ways, perhaps as a
partial copy or as a member of a hierarchical structure. I don't mean to suggest that the states of
rational agents necessarily consist of lists of statements about their situations, however this is how
PRAXIS will be implemented.
S' contains information about the situation S, and it is this information which will be emphasized in
the discussion below. But S' contains other information as well: It contains information about the
currently active intentions of the agent, for example, and perhaps it contains information about recent
states the agent has been in. I will individuate the states I discuss below according to the aspect of
the state I am emphasizing. But all states will in general contain more information than I explicitly
mention.
S is a situation "in the world" and A is an action "in the world", while S' is considered to be
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"internal" to the agent. This separation is not meant to imply any sort of metaphysical dualism, rather
it is to keep the representation relations straight. The agent has no access to the situation as such
directly. The state of the agent is affected by the situation somehow, it is only those aspects of the
situation which have thus affected its state which can have any effect on the action the agent will
take.
State A' is an intention -- a state of the agent whose conditions of satisfaction include that it causes
the action A. For some intentions, the action is as good as taken when the intention forms, other
intentions aren't as reliably linked to their actions, and in fact, there might need to be work done by
the agent in order to determine how to realize them.
To wire in an action in some situation, the agent (or the programmer) must first determine the state
the program will enter when it is in that situation. All potential situations have a wired-in action. In
most cases, the wired-in action will be to begin deliberating about the situation as described below.
But there will be states where the agent will discover more specific responses to wire-in.
4.2.2 Deliberation
Figure 2 illustrates how deliberative actions are related to the rational nexus. State S', as I have said,
may contain representations of the situation. We can speak of the agent as "being in the situation of
being in state S'." This description is certainly true whenever the agent is in state S', it might be
useful to so think of the agent when it must explicitly deal with the fact that it is in that particular
situation. In particular when it must deliberate about what to do in S, it must manipulate
representations of S, these representations are part of state S'. I will (somewhat confusingly, I admit)
call both the state and the situation of being in that state by the same symbol: S'.
State S' ' is the state of the agent corresponding to its being in situation S'. Recall that any situation
in which the agent can find itself can be treated as an instance of a rational nexus. So state S' '
stands in the same relation to situation S' as state S' stands to S. In this case, deliberating is a
rational thing to do (we'll see why below) and so the rational act associated with S' is that of
deliberating about S. Thus perhaps the action of forming an intention to deliberate about S is wired-in
to state S' '. D(S) represents the state of the agent as it begins to deliberate about what to do in
situation S.
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4.2.3 Application of the Theory
In figure 3, we see the initial deliberation method the program must be supplied with. D(S) is wired
into a state corresponding to trying to find a representation of an action A such that R (S) = A, where
R is the explicit theory of rationality. When this has been accomplished, the agent must then form an
intention to perform A.
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As I discussed in the previous chapter, applying the explicit theory is in general very difficult.
However there are many specific situations in which the agent can conclude (or be told) that a
specific action is rational. For example, the agent must be given that the rational act corresponding
to state D(S) is to discover R(S). To put it quasi-formally:
R[D(S)] = find R(S)
Figure 2.
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This particular solution to the problem of applying the explicit theory is an example of the recursive
nature of the theory.
Another example of a specific instance of R (S) crucial to the implementation is the action of forming
an intention to A, given that R(S) = A and S is the current situation. Indeed the entire operation of
the interpreter is controlled by representing each of its steps as specific instances of R(S) for
particular situations.
Every time the agent performs an action in a situation S, it has an instance of R(S) for any situation
which is represented the same way as S was. This is the rationale behind precedential reasoning.
Every specific case of action is stored by PRAXIS as a new rational imperative which it can later apply.
4.2.4 Why Deliberating is Rational
If the state of deliberating about a situation were not wired-in to that situation, the program can still
determine that deliberation is rational by the set of actions illustrated in figure 4.
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In this case, assume that state S' ' is not wired into an intention to deliberate about S. So now the
agent must determine what to do in situation S'. Treating the situation as a rational nexus, we can
see that one possibility is to deliberate about S'. The agent can justify that deliberation is rational
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based on one of two lines of argument:
1. The agent may have only one thing to do if it does not have a wired-in response, namely to
deliberate. So the imperative follows from the agent's limited abilities.
2. The agent may have other things it can do, but deliberating worked in the past -- in other
situations in which it had no wired-in direct response. The imperative follows from precedential
reasoning.
Either of these arguments could also be the justification for wiring in the deliberation action.
Notice that at some level, for some situations, deliberation must be wired-in for the elan grounding of
the theory to be accomplished. But it can always be represented as if the agent did the wiring-in as a
perfectly justified rational action.
4.2.5 Choosing an Imperative
PRAXIS works by interpreting imperatives. Each of them is an instance of R(S) for some particular
situation. The imperatives have the force that any rational agent in a situation corresponding to the
imperative ought to take the indicated action.
A rational imperative is said to match a representation of the current situation if the representation of
the current situation entails the situation part of the imperative. So if the current situation is (partially)
represented as "It is raining" and an imperative is of the form: "If it is raining or snowing, wear your
galoshes!" then the imperative matches the situation. Situations could be represented by lists of
logical statements true therein. In this case matching would involve testing that the statements in the
situation part of the imperative are logical consequences of the statements in the representation of
the current situation.
The method illustrated in figure 5 will be wired-in to the state corresponding to the situation
find R(S) described above.
First the agent will attempt to match all rational imperative against the representation of S. After this
action is complete the agent will be in one of three situations, each of which is associated with an
action:
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M1 A single imperative matches S. In this case the agent ought to form an intention to perform
the action specified by that imperative.
MO No imperatives match S. In this case the agent ought to perform actions which will give it
more information about S and then attempt to try the matching step again.
N>1 More than one imperative matches S. In this case the agent ought to enter state C, and
choose one of the imperatives which match. The result of the choice will be the result of R(S).
In case M1, the forming of an intention to perform the action part of the single matching imperative
can be wired-in to the situation. In the other two cases, the formation of the intentions to continue the
deliberations in the specified way can be wired-in to the situations specified by the result of the
match. These wired-in actions are some of the actions which must be wired-in to provide the elan
grounding for the recursion.
A useful imperative which probably must also appear in the initial arsenal of the interpreter is the
following:
US If in state C and precisely two imperatives match, choose the more specific one.
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Imperative US is consistent with the defeasibility of judgments of rationality -- more information about
a situation can change judgments about what it rational.
The action specified above of matching all imperatives against the current situation is certainly
difficult given that the agent will have very many such imperatives. I don't mean to suggest that this
matching is automatic. The matching process will itself be an action of the agent. And in fact the
agent can spend its spare time constructing a more efficient discrimination network to make this
matching go as fast as possible. It can determine, for example, a set of features of situations which
distinguish large classes of situations, and then wire-in procedures to narrow down the set of
possibilities within those classes.
4.2.6 An Example: Overruling a General Imperative
To illustrate how PRAXIS will operate, I will consider a case where a new rational imperative has been
adopted:
SP: If in state C and imperatives 1186 and 1187 match, choose 1186.
Note that this imperative applies to the same state, C, as US. It specifies a particular case which the
agent may have to consider in state.C and tells what to do there. The point of this example is that we
assume that 1187 is the more specific imperative. The agent may or may not be aware of this and the
fact that imperative SP thus contradicts imperative US. As will be seen, the existence of imperative SP
will result in the agent never even considering which of 1186 or 1187 is the more specific.
Now let us consider what will happen when the agent finds itself in a situation in which which both
1186 and 1187 apply and then begins deliberating. It then enters state C and begins to deliberate
about what to do next. The actions which follow are illustrated in figure 6.
Deliberating about C, the program will enter a state C' corresponding to choosing which imperative to
apply when reasoning about C. Two imperatives apply: US applies because S has two imperatives
(1186 and 1187) which apply. But SP also applies to S because it specifically mentions the two rules
which apply. (I'II assume that no other imperatives apply.)
More than one rule applies at C', so the agent must begin deliberating about what to do there. In the
course of deliberating about C ', it enters state C' '. In this case, only one imperative will apply to its
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deliberations about C' -- namely imperative US because the imperatives which both apply to C' are
US and SP, not the imperatives mentioned by SP. Since only one imperative matches, the system will
immediately apply it.
Applying US in this case means that the system must choose the more specific of the two imperatives
which match in C' -- the imperatives SP and US. It begins to consider which of the two is the more
specific. We assume that it is possible for it to conclude that SP is the more specific (because US
applies in all cases where SP does but not vice-versa) and so C' results in SP being chosen. Now that
SP has been chosen in C', it will be applied and 1186 will be chosen in state S. So the agent will
perform the action specified by imperative 1186.
This example shows how the explicit representation of the actions of the program allows the same
imperative, in this case US, to be to be overruled by another imperative as a result of being obeyed in
a different situation.
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5. Research Proposal
I propose a course of research:
1. I will finish the development and explication of the theoretical and conceptual issues
surrounding the notion of rationality and my proposed theory.
Many of the issues dealt with here are philosophical. I believe their discussion is a contribution in
itself to some of the philosophical questions surrounding the nature of rationality -- such as action,
freedom, reasoning, representation and finiteness. I consider the demonstration that an intellectualist
account of rationality can be made to work to be the main contribution of this research.
2. I will develop a model for occurrences in which plans, goals, agents, and the theory of
rationality itself can be expressed. I will implement a representational system based on this model of
occurrences.
Representational issues have lately become very central to Al research. One of the problems in the
methods by which this research is carried out is its typical aim for generality and consequent lack of
focus. Simply put: such research is meant to develop systems good for representing everything, they
are therefore really good at representing very little. My work will emphasize the representation of
actions and the processes which go into the generation of actions.
3. I will express the structural theory of rationality in this representational system.
This will involve filling out the details of the situations and actions involved in the generation of
rational actions, the explicit application of the theory of rationality, precedential reasoning, and
manipulating the computational embodiment of the agent in order to wire-in actions.
Interest in "meta" reasoning is strong in Al, but is almost completely unjustified by the performance of
any program which uses it. One of the problems has been the lack of a careful explication of what,
exactly, meta reasoning is and how it is related to other kinds of reasoning. This is precisely the job
for the structural theory. In it, situations and their associated actions are described and the relations
among the actions are set forth.
4. I will experiment in hopes of determining which problems must be solved, and which
solutions must be wired-in in order for an agent to be able to ever be able to take an action.
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Although my approach to this problem will be empirical, there might be relevant mathematical
techniques. Semantics of programs which have access to their own state and context are being
developed. [Barwise & Smith, personal communication] An important question any such semantics
must answer is if a particular program will ever do anything. Perhaps the recursive definition of
rationality can also be formalized.
5. I will implement a simulation of a rational agent whose operations are as the theory of
rationality describes.
The program will control a representation of the agent. The agent will, as described above, have
access to the program which implements it. And the agent will make use of an explicit theory of
rationality in order to determine what it will do. The simulation will illustrate the use of precedential
reasoning, reasoning about limitations, and wiring-in (and unwiring) actions.
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6. Related Work
The work closest in spirit to that of the present proposal is that of Jon Doyle. [Doyle, 1980] presents a
theory of introspective rationality covering many of the same issues as I intend to. But Doyle's theory
was never implemented, and the failure to implement the theory resulted in several important issues
never being addressed. For example, Doyle never demonstrates that his methods for deliberation
would ever terminate. He presents a few heuristics for deliberation but gives no indication that they
are enough or necessary or even valid. The work I am proposing takes Doyle's work as inspiration
and foundation, with a view towards overcoming its limitations.
In [Smith] we find some suggestions about how a fully introspective system could be implemented.
Smith's system is a LISP-like interpreter, not a problem solver, but the techniques he uses to
implement "reflection" might be relevant to an introspective problem solver. Smith's trick is based on
a careful examination of his reflective interpreter to identify the possible states the system may be in
when it reflects and gains access to its own state and context. The program is therefore able to
construct the state that the "higher level" interpreter would have been in had it been really operating
all along.
Fuller discussions of Smith and Doyle, as well as more elaboration of the motivation for introspective
problem solvers are found in [Batali, 1983].
Very little of the Al planning literature is relevant to this work. This is because the research has
involved very limited models of actions and situations. Research in reasoning about programs has at
least involved action models powerful enough to express computational entities, but is still limited.
Neither approach has addressed the fundamental problems of determining what is relevant to a
problem or how to formalize a problem domain. And planning programs have usually been separated
from the performance of the plans they construct. An exception are "robot" languages like AML
[Taylor, et al] in which plans are made and then executed, and their progress is tested and compared
with expectations.
An area in which recent planning work is relevant is in the modeling of time for planning. [Allen]
presents a system in which events occur during and between "intervals" which are partially ordered
in time. Similar representations of time have appeared in the philosophical literature (for example:
[Rescher & Urquhart]).
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[Davis] and [Geneserethl present systems in which "meta" reasoning is done to control and direct the
main operations of a program. Their systems illustrate the power which even simple introspective
abilities can bring. However in both approaches the meta reasoning is kept separate from the
reasoning done at the domain level. Reasoning is not treated as a kind of action, at least not the same
kind of action as that done at the domain level.
A number of efforts in Al have viewed analogy as a matter of mappings between representational
structures. (For example: [Winston] and [Gentner]) Work on dependency maintenance systems
[Doyle, 1979] has involved programs keeping records of the logical dependencies among their
inferences. Such dependencies allow the programs to quickly draw inferences when a set of
premises is the same as one previously encountered. [Batali, forthcoming] presents a theorem
proving system which keeps records of its accomplishments and attempts to prove new theorems by
finding analogy-like mappings to previously proved ones.
The main area in artificial intelligence in which sophisticated models of action and Intentionality is to
be found is that of natural language understanding. Researchers in this area understood early that
little sense could be made of a sentence or story without a decent model of the human world of goals,
purposes, and Intentional action. [Wilensky] presents the basis for a natural language understanding
system which involves explicit representation of the plans and goals of agents, as well as their "meta"
reasoning about those plans and goals.
The theory of action has been a topic for philosophers from the very first. Usually discussed in the
domain of ethics, an important problem is the relation of an action to an intention. These and other
problems relevant to filling out what I call the "structural theory" of rationality are discussed in
[White]. [Searle] presents a version of the "volitional" account of action which holds that an action is
a bodily movement caused by an Intentional state. The theory of action I employ is based on Searle's.
In fact, the first part of filling out the structural theory will be to attempt to represent Searle's theory of
action. The problems involved in practical reasoning, some in what I have called the "structural
theory" and a few observations about the "deontic theory" have been receiving attention (see [Raz]).
Existentialist philosophers have emphasized the "finitude" of humans and the attendant problems
this raises (see [Barrett]). It is not clear to me if they take note of the fact that an understanding of
one's limitations can be used to help decide what to do. [Simon] argues that limitations in available
information and information handling abilities should figure in a theory of rational decision making.
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[Cherniak] considers how computability and computational complexity issues present limitations for
any finite agent. He suggests that a theory of rationality ought to take these considerations into
account.
Kant (in [Liddell]) attempts to characterize properties of a rational agent which can be discovered by
appeal to the notion of rationality alone, properties which Kant calls a priori because they don't
depend on particular situations or facts about human biology. The famous categorical imperative has
a strong relation to the justification of precedential reasoning. Kant is also an intellectualist and can
be read as suggesting that some degree of introspection is involved in rationality.
Searle and Dreyfus, as well as writers in the Existentialist and Pragmatic traditions (see [Bernstein]),
emphasize the importance of viewing an agent as embodied in the world, as participating in the
causal structure of the world. For such workers action is the dominant concern. Far too much of
Cognitive Science has inherited the empiricist epistemologist's worry about the validity of knowledge
gained through the senses. But it must never be forgotten that the' rational agent is immersed in a
world to which it must respond. As Karl Marx suggests, the rational agent must do more than
"interpret the world in various ways; the point is to change it."
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